PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) add, histories that affect other histories: concepts are always in motion. And these concepts 'change' the 'reality' of the room: they do not just represent, but take part in the world they appear, according to Bergson, to describe.
Why even try to write about Artaud? The discourse surrounding Artaud's 'exceptionalism' gets, once again, to the heart (the gut, perhaps) of modern and contemporary philosophy and performance's joint investments in the problem of criticism as a problem of judgment. Ever since Kant, if not before, the philosophical problem par excellence has been judgment. According to Deleuze (1993) , in an essay on Artaud, Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, and Kafka, judgment binds modern philosophy and drama, specifically tragedy; and it has done so since the Greeks. In tragedy, judgment is the action around which all others lie: in Antigone, judgment of the individual against a social order she refuses; in Agamemnon, judgment of a father who chose power over kinship. After Kant, philosophers judge what is beautiful, good; what is ethical. They describe and judge. A philosopher who does not judge, consequently is not a philosopher: this has been the accusation leveraged against a long line of Continental thinkers who chose plasticity, pliability, escape over categorical decisions, the stark contrast of a yes or a no. After WWII and the student upheavals of May 1968 in Paris, hierarchies putatively dissolved or were shaken; motion came to be a principle of historical agency almost on its own terms, differently from what Marx had conceived. No longer were philosophers bringing change to the world; their whole relationship to the world was in question.
They did not just reflect on a world exterior to them; they were part of a world, literally in the streets, for some. Between subject and object, a chasm fell. Philosophy had to change too. It became, in this sense, performative. It began to act.
But with this acting, came further accusations of fakery, charlatanism. These philosophers only spun words, the dissolution between subject and object, thinking mind and hard thing did not meet in a moving, fluid, vital world of cross-pollination, mutually invested flows, but stopped, apparently, at a page on which subjects and objects became confused, indistinguishable. This was largely leveraged against Derrida, the writer-poet par excellence, whose attempts at decentering a center, remarginalizing a heavy body of philosophical thought met with equal critique, largely from the other side of the Channel, in debates so memorialized they hardly bear repeating here. Like Deleuze, Derrida met Artaud in a playful, performative space of philosophical recuperation: Artaud invited thinking, his work and person invited different ways of thinking, a zone between "criticism" and the "clinic" ("critique" and "clinique," as Derrida writes in "La parole soufflée" [1967] ). Psychiatry was in a shambles, in the wake of experiments by R. D. Laing, Félix Guattari and others: not only in the pages of Foucault's writing, after Georges Canguilhem, but in practice, hierarchies and concepts of normalcy were being radically rewritten. A 'mad' person, an 'aliéné mental' may not be mad; according to the tenets of schizo-analysis, the world around them was madder. They became mad because they 'failed' (arguably, in one way or another, refused) to 'fit' within a society whose bureaucracies, and petty methods of social control, stifled them. In order to be 'cured' they only needed to find alternative ways of being in this world, not like Kafka crushed by the weight of futility, but by picking up a paintbrush, say (in the case of Mary Barnes, at the famous antipsychiatric Kingsley Hall [Guattari 1995] ). Society had judged them; but taken from a different perspective, it was the society, the whole edifice of society, that was sick. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015)
Critic and clinic jointly floundered, and with them tragedy and philosophy came tumbling down too. In their place, rose performance. And at the crest of this wave, rode the spectre of Artaud. His madness, from a schizoanalytical perspective, was not madness; as he wrote of Van Gogh, in Van Gogh, suicidé de la société (1947) , the society around them was perverse. In the case of Van Gogh, it It also seeks to exorcise Artaud -who called himself a "mômo," slang for "madman," in derision against those who judged him as such, and in self-mockery -to purge him from a world of overtheorization, offer a work with, rather than at him, without regard to what it might mean to be delirious, schizophrenic, insane, all terms Artaud had suffered during his near decade of psychiatric institutionalization, beginning in 1938 at the Sainte Anne hospital, where he was admitted after an explosive trip to Ireland. He had gone as Saint Patrick, equipped with St. Patrick's walking stick, in search of the saint's birthplace. Dr. Jacques Lacan, who saw Artaud at Sainte Anne, described him as "incurable." And for nine years, until his release from the Rodez hospital in southern France, Artaud was institutionalized, also malnourished, and supported from time to time, by Dr. Gaston Ferdière in particular, in his endeavours to draw and to write (Artaud [1947 (Artaud [ ] 2003 .
Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu was commissioned by Fernand Pouey for a new programme, « La voix des poètes » (Poets' voices or, more accurately, the poets' voice, in fact suggesting the singularity of a voice in spite of a plurality of poet bodies). Artaud spent months writing and subsequently recording his text, with his friends and collaborators Paule Thévenin, Roger Blin and Maria Casarès. But Wladimir Porché, director general at Radio France, vetoed the broadcast once he had heard the result.
2 A surge of protestation and public debate ensued, a veritable "Affaire
Artaud," with articles in dozens of French newspapers on the Left and the Right pouring over the purported pros and cons of this decision (Artaud [1947 (Artaud [ ] 2003 . Artaud came to be at the center of a national drama about judgment: about whether it was right or wrong to judge a work made by a man who was putatively exceptional, who exceeded the boundaries of good taste and bienséance, or normally acceptable behaviour. His recording became a "human document," in the words of some, who defended its broadcast on the grounds that he was an exception. This pushed his theatre of cruelty onto a future plane, and so too, as has been emphasized again and again by criticism in its wake, onto a plane of supposed impossibility. Artaud's theatre is putatively theoretical, this view suggests, not only because he wrote few play texts (though Kimberly Jannarone [2010] has been at great pains to show not only that his politics were less leftleaning than some commentators allow, but also that his theatre work as a director has been radically overlooked). But because his writing -his "manifesto" for a theatre of cruelty -was philosophical: it judged the world around it as corrupt, and proposed a vision for how this world could be excised, replaced, improved upon.
Yet what these readings often fail to address is the extent to which Artaud sought real action in the world through his public broadcasting, a commission that had promised him an audience of 15 million listeners. As a performance, it meant not only to reflect on, but to change the world, and it was actual; the recording he intended for this effect did take place. It was heard by a small socalled "circle of initiates," specially called on to help determine whether it would be fit for public consumption; and on the initiative of a new student press, Nyza, followed by the independent K éditeurs, it found a life on the page, though he had said publication of the text without attendant sounds would be a "disaster" (Artaud [1947] 2003, 98-99).
What I aim to suggest is that with Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu, Artaud eschews modern philosophy and tragedy, inasmuch as he eschews the institution of judgment: that which, he says, he suffered from his entire life. He does this by undercutting the very concept of individuality: that against which, as Deleuze reminds us in "Pour en finir avec le jugement," judgment necessarily strikes. Without organs organising a body into an individual person, and without a legal, social, political and philosophical system conceptualising of this organised body as an individual entity that can take action and suffer the consequences of these actions against a supposedly coherent social whole, the "self" dissolves into pure porosity. But also, as Artaud suggests in his radio play, it dissolves into the mountains, the earth. again appears as a spectral individual it is impossible to reckon with except by recorporealizing his cries, juxtaposing these to recordings he himself made, and which are now publicly available (Artaud 1947; Artaud [1947 Artaud [ ] 1995 Artaud [1947 Artaud [ ] 1996 . The entanglement of representation, recorporealization, and repetition, reverberation or echo uncannily pay homage to Artaud's work and refuse the homage, transforming his work in the process. Their piece offers a version of his work that by its title already refuses the hyperindividualization and what I would venture to call the discourse of utter alterity that has surrounded him, subjecting Artaud to a public theatre of support purporting an enlightened refusal of judgment that paradoxically judges him on the same. In this view, he is so exceptional he is not even allowed to attend his own public trial.
This making-tragedy of his life and work has rendered it aporetic, impossible, and at the same time hypertrophic: Artaud becomes the tragic hero, in a drama of reindividuation whose only outcome seems to be an infinitely receding philosophical discourse predicated on his utter alterity: an utter alterity he refused, as he sought to remain both like everyone else and multiple. In an article on the use of the "schizophrenic" in contemporary theory, Catherine Prendergast (2008) takes Deleuze and Guattari, Baudrillard, Jameson, and others to task for relying on the figure of the "exceptional"
schizophrenic as representative of all that is non-normative, anti-capitalistic, creative, disinhibited, free, and ultimately more closely connected to reality than everyone else. She argues that a far greater number of "unexceptional" than "exceptional" schizophrenics populate the halls of hospitals, schools and factories in everyday life, and that they are not helped by the grossly distorted, romantic terms postmodern and poststructuralist theory have imposed. These "unexceptional" schizophrenics, she points out, are concerned with job retention, benefits, medical care, and the not insignificant challenge of having their own "voice." Paradoxically, Artaud too, the quintessential, arguably the paradigmatic "exceptional" schizophrenic in modern and contemporary thought, suffered from this same discourse of exceptionalism, which extracted him from the simple, stupid pleasures of human concourse and horizontal affiliation. PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015)
In attempting to dramatize the violence of judgment and of the institutions that box and quarter people who fail to fit these bounds -all of whom suffer in one way or another from this disconnection -Artaud made a work in which he attempted performatively to extract himself from the individualizing impulse of philosophy, a stand-in for the God who judges, while maintaining in everyday life to be an individual capable of political agency. That he has only come to be all the more adulated in philosophy and attendant fields suggests that the performance of selfimmolation, negativity and refusal, only excites critique further. Criticism and clinicalism are still not so far apart. Even poststructuralist philosophy, which performs flow, and attempts to thinkwith, teeters at the edge of hypertrophism. This is why I did not want to write on Artaud, and yet why, at the outset of a venture that purports explosively to commingle philosophy and drama, in a performative orgasm of holy communion, it seems urgent to attempt to reckon again with what may be construed as an originary act, a moment of drama and philosophy that is arguably also neither. (Artaud [1947 (Artaud [ ] 2003 . Pierre Laroche wrote on 11 February in the satirical Le Canard enchaîné that the radio broadcast was "a surprising human -even superhuman -document" ["un étonnant document humain et même surhumain"] (Artaud [1947 (Artaud [ ] 2003 .
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